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Abstract 
This paper examines the main theoretical perspectives on the process of financial change in 
modern capitalism. It discusses institutionalist political economy approaches claiming that 
their conception of states, markets and financial innovation is problematic when analysing 
financial globalisation. In order to consider how the internationalisation of financial practices 
can be studied, this article suggests that a necessary step is that of firstly deconstructing the 
model of Anglo-Saxon capitalism as present in the literature. Whereas scholars have 
emphasised deregulation in the explanation of the development of financial practices, this 
essay emphasizes that in key respects their development in the Anglo-American core has 
been profoundly shaped by the actions and interests of state actors and at the end, it rests on 
a set of highly formalised set of institutions. This allows this paper to locate historically the 
peculiar American institutional roots of modern financial practices, focusing on the 
singularity of the social contexts in which practices emerge rather than studying finance 
solely in relation to the liberal nature of the state. After this, it proposes a theoretical 
framework to conceive the relationship between states and markets in international contexts 
from a historical agency-centred perspective. 
 
Keywords: Political Economy of Finance, financialisation, neoliberal state, Anglo-
Saxon countries. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The term financialisation has often been read with reference to “the 
increasing importance of financial markets, financial motives, financial 
institutions, and financial elites in the operation of the economy and its 
                                               
*  Pasquale De Girolamo is a PhD student in social and political change at the University of 
Florence and Turin, Italy. His thesis analyses the history of mortgage relations in the U.S. 
housing market since the 1960s. His broader research interests include the political 
economy of debt and financial innovation (pasquale.degirolamo@unifi.it). 
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governing institutions, both at the national and international levels.”1 While 
mainstream economics has supported the idea of the informational efficiency of 
financial markets
2
 the institutionalist strand of Political Economy (PE) has 
emphasised the crisis-prone and exploitative nature of modern finance. This 
literature is an invaluable resource for exploring the expansion of finance in 
modern capitalism, in that scholars from this perspective have contributed to the 
understanding of financialisation by analysing its relationship with diverse 
forms of governance. More specifically, part of institutionalist PE contends that 
the turn of economic activities towards financial speculation represents the 
logical outcome of deregulated forms of capitalism. From this perspective, 
Anglo-Saxon countries represent the iconic model of speculative capitalism in 
which politics is said to have surrendered to the interests of creditors’ agendas 
and financial capital. However, this article claims that this literature by 
portraying Anglo-American states as submissive subjects of creditor plans ends 
up underestimating their agency in the development of financial speculation. To 
remedy this bias, the article problematises the idea that financialisation is the 
natural outcome of Anglo-Saxon forms of governance by taking a closer look at 
the development of speculative practices in the United States and their spread in 
the United Kingdom. This will be done by drawing upon recent rich historical 
contributions to the development of financial practices in the United States and 
the United Kingdom respectively.
3
 Building on these works, the paper argues 
that the state interests played a central role in the development of 
financialisation in both instances: what has been superficially interpreted by the 
literature as financial liberalisation has, actually, improved these states’ capacity 
to act in financial markets and govern the economy more broadly. These 
historical insights call for a substantive change in the way PE scholars analyse 
the process of financialisation in the international context. As a fact, the 
institutional PE debate falls short of providing the analytical space for studying 
in what manners and why people outside the Anglo-American heartland 
experience financialised practices through modalities that are institutionally and 
discursively diverse.
4
 Rather, current debates would benefit from a renewed 
focus on the innovative ways in which states react to the challenges of 
financialisation. To do this, this paper proposes an agency-centred perspective 
                                               
1  Gerald Epstein, Financialization, rentier interests, and central bank policy, MA manuscript, 
Amherst, Department of Economics, University of Massachusetts, December 2001. 
2  Burton G. Malkiel and Eugene F. Fama, “Efficient capital markets: A review of theory 
and empirical work”, The journal of Finance, vol. 25, no. 2 197, pp. 383-417. 
3  Martijn Konings, The Development of American Finance, New York, Cambridge 
University Press, 2011; Sahil Jai Dutta, “Sovereign Debt Management and the 
Globalization of Finance: Recasting the City of London’s ‘Big Bang’”, Competition and 
Change, vol. 22, no. 1, 2018, pp.3-21. 
4  Samuel Knafo, “The Fetishizing Subject in Marx’s Capital”, Capital & Class, issue 76, 
pp. 145-175, 2002. 
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which studies the development of financial practices with an appreciation of the 
historical context.  
This paper is divided into three sections. The first section deconstructs 
the category of financialisation as elaborated by institutionalist scholarship in 
Political Economy. These approaches by analysing the process of 
financialisation in relation to the degree of state regulation, end up supporting 
the notion that the turn towards financial activities inevitably undermines the 
state’s agency. The second section will re-calibrate this assumption by 
presenting an overview of state actions in the financial sector in some key 
historical moments in American and British financialisation, showing how state 
interests and actions have played a major role in giving a specific rationality to 
financial development. Based on these insights the third section will offer a 
research program to the study of financialisation in both the Anglo-Saxon and 
the international context. This section will argue that in order to study state-
market relations in contemporary societies, we need to analyse the continued 
way in which the imperative of financialisation is interpreted by different social 
actors in different contexts, rather than in relation to state deregulation/ 
regulation as suggested by the institutionalist literature.  
 
 
The False Dichotomy of Institutionalist Political Economy 
 
There has been a growing consensus that the separation between the 
study of politics and economics has revealed problematic when analysing the 
spread of financial practices worldwide.
5
 Recently, this debate has thrust 
scholars in an interdisciplinary attempt to debunk the notions and categories of 
the traditional boundaries of the social sciences. A thriving body of literature 
carrying the old-fashioned label of “Political economy”67 (PE), ventured in the 
                                               
5  While from a purely economic perspective the era of globalisation is depicted as one of an 
inevitable evolutionary logic of markets and societies, on the other hand, the political 
science scholarship has presented consolidation of the decision-making in democratic 
system, from the 1980s onwards. Thomas Poguntke and Paul Webb, “The 
Presidentialization of Politics in Democratic Societies: Politics in Democratic Societies: A 
Framework for Analysis”, in The Presidentialization of Politics: A Comparative Study of 
Modern Democracies, 2007, Oxford, Oxford University Press, pp. 1-25.  
6  For an overview about the origins and evolution of political economy, see Kees Van der 
Pijl, A Survey of Global Political Economy, Centre For Global Political Economy, 
University of Sussex, 2009. 
7  This is not to say that the variety of PE approaches can be described in such static terms. 
The article’s understanding of PE perspective acknowledges the variegated nature of the 
discipline, which integrates constructivist, post-structuralist, actor-network, and neo-
Gramscian approaches. Rather the focus of this paper revolves around the specific and 
influential strand in the PE literature that is identified as institutionalist.  
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intellectual process to draw upon economics and political science (along with 
law, history, sociology and other disciplines) in explaining the crucial role of 
political factors in shaping economic life.
8
 More specifically, the institutionalist 
strand of Political economy,
9
 in its international and comparative variations, - 
International Political Economy (IPE) and Comparative Political Economy 
(CPE) - has been involved in an ongoing debate over the political significances 
of the process of financialisation. Whilst on one hand, IPE literature brings into 
focus the role of financialisation in exerting a competitive pressure on the state 
to deregulate financial markets,
10
 on the other, CPE
11
 rightly underlines the 
political and social institutions underpinning global financial market relations.
12
 
In other words, one of CPE’s central claim questions the conventional 
assumption concerning market universality and the convergence of all societies 
towards a unique model of capitalism as suggested by academics in IPE.
13
 CPE 
Scholars empirically demonstrated the persistence of the institutional 
configurations and their relevance for the study of the internationalisation of 
finance. This is visible in the way in which researchers separate capitalism into 
two separate models: liberal and coordinated market economies (LMEs and 
                                               
8  Ronen Palan, Global Political Economy : Contemporary Theories, London, Routledge, 
2000; Matthew Watson, Foundations of International Political Economy, Basingstoke, 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2005. 
9  This strand is different from the American radical institutionalist tradition of Political 
Economy represented by authors such as Thorstein Veblen and John R. Commons. 
10  Stephen R. Gill and David Law, “Global Hegemony and the Structural Power of Capital”, 
International Studies Quarterly, vol. 33, no. 4. 1989, pp. 475-499; Susan Strange, States 
and Markets, London, Bloomsbury Publishing, 2015; Eric Helleiner, “States and the Re-
emergence of Global Finance – From Bretton Woods to the 1990s” Global Finance, 
Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1994. 
11  CPE’s main claim can be seen as a part of the general movement in political science 
whose central aim was to “bring the state back in”. See Peter B. Evans et al., Bringing the 
State Back In, New York, Cambridge University Press, 1985. 
12  John Zysman, “American Industry in International Competition: Government Policies and 
Corporate Strategies”, California Management Review, vol. 25, no. 3, 2013, pp. 27-52; 
Peter A. Hall and David Soskice, Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations 
of Comparative Advantage, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2001; Katrin Vitols, 
“Reforming the German Labour Market: The Case of Temporary Agency Work: A 
Changing Role of Temporary Agency Work in the German Employment Model?”, 
Competition and Change, vol. 8, no. 4, 2004; Iain Hardie, David Howarth, Sylvia 
Maxfield, and Amy Verdun, “Banks and the False Dichotomy in the Comparative 
Political Economy of Finance”, World Politics, vol. 65, no. 4, Cambridge University 
Press, 2013, pp. 691–728. 
13  Theda Skocpol, “Bringing the State Back in: Strategies of Analysis in Current Research”, 
Bringing the State Back In, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1985; Kathleen A. 
Thelen, “How Institutions Evolve. Insights from Comparative Historical Analysis”, in 
James Mahoney and Dietrich  Rueschemeyer (eds.), Comparative Historical Analysis in 
the Social Sciences, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2003, pp. 208-240. 
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CMEs).
14
 Whereas the Anglo-Saxon model (LME) is considered the typical 
form of capitalism in that activities are organized via competitive market 
dynamics, the European model (CME) is peculiar in that states traditionally 
have had a more central role in the economy, relying on non-market 
relationships in their governance.
15
 However, the global financial crisis of 2008 
has profoundly questioned the vision of the world economy advocated from 
CPE and reinvigorated one of the main arguments of IPE approaches: that the 
global dimensions of the meltdown are once more the sign of the end of 
institutional diversity to the global crisis-prone tendency of Anglo-Saxon 
capitalism.
16
 While participants in the financialisation debate disagree over the 
meaning and extent of the phenomenon, they are largely united in the view that 
financialisation impacts negatively on state power. More specifically, although 
CPE and IPE have been attentive to different aspects of the process of 
financialisation, these approaches have come to situate themselves on two 
different poles of the same explanatory strategy. In their description of 
financialisation, both these approaches share a specific appropriation of the 
work of Karl Polanyi,
17
 in which markets are described as possessing a 
disembedding logic and institutions are viewed as society devices to (re)embed 
the market and subordinate it to social and political purposes. 
Still, this paper claims that swaying back and forth from a position of a 
triumph of financialisation to one of institutional resistance to the latter is 
problematic. Whilst this paper agrees on the importance of using an 
interdisciplinary approach to the study of financialisation, these theories have 
tended to reproduce a structuralism -and a division of academic labour- of their 
own. Crucially, this conceptual framework suffers from two problematic 
deficiencies in the analysis of the process of financialisation. The first stems 
from the suggestion that the lack of state intervention consolidated the 
development of financial practices. This institutionalist conception of finance is 
problematic when related to PE’s central claim about the necessity to 
                                               
14  This paper acknowledges that this tradition has continuously re-elaborated this division. 
However, an elaborated discussion of this distinction is -whilst undoubtedly appealing- 
beyond the scope of this paper.  
15  John Zysman, “American Industry in International Competition: Government Policies and 
Corporate Strategies”, California Management Review, vol. 25, no. 3, April 1983, pp. 27–
52; Peter A. Hall and David Soskice, “An Introduction to Varieties of Capitalism”, in 
Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage, 
Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2001; Katrin Vitols, “Reforming the German Labour 
Market: The Case of Temporary Agency Work: A Changing Role of Temporary Agency 
Work in the German Employment Model?”, Competition and Change, vol. 8, no.4, 2004, 
pp. 375-389. 
16  Wolfgang Streeck, How Will Capitalism End? : Essays on a Failing System, New York, 
Verso Books, 2016. 
17  Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation: Economic and Political Origins of Our Time, 
New York, Rinehart, 1944. 
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conceptualise markets and finance as a social construction. Indeed, these 
analyses have come to forge a strict association between speculation and liberal 
forms of governance, often representing speculative finance as being directly 
related to the degree of state regulation, or “embeddedness” of finance.18 In 
other words, the development of speculative practices is considered a 
consequence of the relative absence of institutional constraints, which left 
financial markets free to “to develop on their own”. In this scheme, while 
speculation and finance represent the natural outcome of advanced and 
deregulated forms of capitalism, by tracing speculative finance back to the weak 
institutional context of these economies, researchers often suggest, even if 
inadvertently, that financial practices take place in somewhat of a social 
vacuum.
19
 This way of framing markets is problematic in that it misses the point 
of constructivist approach, which would argue that economic rationality – in 
this case, financialisation- is socially constructed by norms, habits and 
discourses.
20
 A second problem is that this theory reduces the highly variable 
ways in which states react to the challenges of financialisation. In particular, the 
attempt at framing markets’ development in terms of an a-social expansive logic 
is a proposition that can be maintained solely by relying on a peculiar 
understanding of a state agency. As a fact, even though CPE attempts to bring 
the institutions back into the story of financial change, it leaves behind an 
ambiguity over how to conceptualise the agency of the state in the reforms. 
State actors are presented as either facilitating or resisting deregulation and 
market rules, having almost no power in shaping the form in which financial 
markets work once established. In other words, these approaches abstract states’ 
actions in a-historical terms - i.e. within a regulatory framework
21
- and 
consequently deny other forms of state actions in finance.
22
 In other words, 
                                               
18  Samuel Knafo, “Liberalisation and the Political Economy of Financial Bubbles”, 
Competition & Change, vol. 13, no. 2 June 2009, pp. 128–44. 
19  Indeed, these approaches think about finance looking at its relation to productive 
investments. This conception derives from various notions that evaluate finance capital 
according to their ability to provide savings into productive investments of firms. The 
implication of this is that CPE understands contemporary processes of financial expansion 
solely in antithetical terms, as representing a distortion of the healthy development of 
productive economies. This productivist bias (which is more explicit in CPE tradition) has 
reinforced the idea that speculation is the logical corollary of deregulated forms of 
capitalism 
20  Peter L Berger and Thomas Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in 
the Sociology of Knowledge, Doubleday, 1967, p. 219.  
21  Furthermore, these kinds of analysis are too focus on high-level of state governance, 
failing to rightly appreciate the central role of lower-level social institutions Leonard 
Seabrooke, “What Do i Get? The Everyday Politics of Expectations and the Subprime 
Crisis”, New Political Economy, vol. 15, no. 1, 2010. 
22  Even when attempting to study the historical contingency of state’s agency, they tend to 
narrow the highly variable ways in which states behave towards the world. Quentin 
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although one of modern-day PE’s central claims is that the distinction between 
politics and economics should not be mistaken for a material separation, these 
approaches have ended up reinforcing the theoretical assumption on the 
opposing logics of states and markets.
23
 
 
 
Revisiting the Anglo-Saxon Roots of Financialisation 
 
Based on the traditional proximity between Anglo-Saxon economies and 
the fact that London and New York have been the last two dominant financial 
centres globally, the pieces of literatures above mentioned have often 
considered the liberal nature of these economies as the key variable behind the 
dynamics of speculation. They suggest that financial practices developed 
originally in the United Kingdom during the era of classical liberalism, to then 
reappear successively in the United States in the late XX century.
24
 Between 
these two periods, the post-war era was marked by the rise of the regulated 
market and thus a victory of the interventionist state over laissez-faire finance. 
“Embedded liberalism”25 thus restricted speculation to re-emerge – according to 
this Polanyian approach-during the neoliberal era following the demise of the 
Bretton Woods system.
26
 It is from this perspective that IPE scholars sustain 
that speculative finance, once fully disembedded, spread worldwide through the 
process of financialisation at the expenses of state agencies.
27
 This story has 
been opportunely constructed to reinforce the association of speculation to 
liberalisation. Yet, this apparently straightforward conjunction hides a more 
complex reality which contradicts some of these key assumptions in the 
literature. More specifically, this linear strategy of explanation makes it difficult 
to historicize financial practices and masks some significant specificities within 
                                                                                                                   
Skinner, Visions of Politics. Volume 1, Regarding Method, Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 2002. 
23  David Coates, “Paradigms of Explanation”, in Varieties of Capitalism, Varieties of 
Approaches, Springer, 2005, pp. 1-25 . As Hanckè states: “[...]convergence and 
divergence are concepts that simply do not offer a very useful framework for 
understanding economic activity in advanced capitalist economies […] actors engage in 
pragmatic experimentation, trying out different solutions within the broad institutional 
and normative paradigm that they found themselves.” Bob Hanck   Debating  arieties of 
Capitalism: A Reader, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2009, p. 7.  
24  Charles P. Kindleberger, The World in Depression, 1929-1939, Berkeley and Los 
Angeles, University of California Press, 1973. 
25  John Gerard Ruggie, “International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded 
Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order”, International Organization, vol. 36, no. 2, 
1982, pp. 379-415. 
26  Eric Helleiner, “States and the Reemergence of Global Finance – From Bretton Woods to 
the 1990s”, Global Finance, 1987. 
27  Susan Strange, States and Markets, London, Bloomsbury Publishing, 1988. 
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the process of financialisation. Various historical evidences show instead that 
the financial histories of the U.S. and the U.K. differ also according to the ways 
in which states acted in finance. These qualitatively different trajectories can 
hardly be clarified through the theoretical lens offered by the perspectives 
mentioned above.  
It is thus in order to remedy this bias and in line with a developing 
number of scholarships that this article traces the origin of speculative practices 
in their particular social contexts, showing how crucial these are for our 
understanding of financialisation. A first step towards this is to problematize the 
English-American model proposing that modern financial practices -such as 
liability management- have their roots in the United States and then spread to 
the United Kingdom. This brief examination will be advanced to argue that the 
exceptional development of speculative practices in the Anglo-Saxon heartland 
did not originate from the so-called “liberal” nature of national governance, but 
rather that the rationality of finance has been profoundly shaped by the interest 
and actions of the states in question. To do this, it is important to bring to the 
fore two crucial but often neglected aspects of modern finance. Financial 
practices are frequently studied as an inherent tendency of financial actors when 
left outside supervision, so much that scholars have treated speculation 
throughout history as having the same logic over time. However, many authors 
have instead pointed out how much financial practices have changed over time, 
and how a distinction between pre- modern and modern forms of finance can be 
established and can roughly correspond to the English and American models.
28
 
Pre-modern forms of speculation and finance consisted essentially in various 
types of arbitrage as speculators sought to exploit price differentials among 
various markets. The second and more modern form of speculation revolves on 
a different logic. Its most recognisable form is financial securitisation
29
 – the 
process of transforming illiquid assets such as bank loans into securities that can 
be traded on financial markets. In other words, while pre-modern financial 
practices ware present since the 15
th
 century from Italy to the British context, 
the developments which occurred in the U.S. in the 20
th
 century were radically 
different.
30
 Indeed, many authors argue that the post-WWII wave of financial 
globalisation is qualitatively different from the relatively contained dynamics of 
financial globalisation under British hegemony
31
 and, moreover, whilst the U.K. 
                                               
28  Samuel Knafo, “Liberalisation and the Political Economy of Financial Bubbles”, 
Competition & Change, vol. 13, no. 2, June 2009, pp. 128–44. 
29  For a review on this technology see Leon. T. Kendall and Michael J. Fishman (eds.), A 
primer on securitization, Cambridge, The MIT Press, 2000.  
30  The most defining feature of US finance has been the practice of securitisation which 
helped financial actors to pass on their liabilities in order to generate new resources for 
further transactions and has helped to dramatically expand the money supply. 
31  The capacity of British-style finance to penetrate other Western national social formations 
had been highly limited and the stability it provided was perfectly compatible with a range 
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was still restructuring its post-WWII economic schemes, the expansion of 
American finance was by that time gathering pace.
32
 This historically-grounded 
distinctions are useful for formulating and detecting the specific and peculiar 
socially constructed nature of American Finance and its successive spread to the 
United Kingdom.  
 
 
The American roots of financialisation 
 
This section will analyse the social construction of American speculation, 
showing how the state contributed to the construction of financial practices. 
This means considering, for example, that the Wall street crisis of 1929 was not 
the mere reflection of the free-market era, but it was crucially triggered by the 
institutionalisation of the Federal Reserve central banking. Following 
Konings,
33
 the nineteenth-century agrarian context of the American economy 
suffered from a chronic lack of liquid assets, leading commercial banks to 
pioneer a distinctive form of “financial banking”. Banks and other financial 
institutions were mainly concerned with gaining access to funds, becoming 
specialised at using other channels, such as going directly on the market to find 
funds rather than depend on deposits as it was the case in Europe. The 
development of securitization practices had the effect of triggering recurrent 
crises brought on by the sudden evaporation of market liquidity. While the 
foundation of the Federal Reserve system in 1913
34
 was a governmental 
response to this, the presence of a lender of last resort served to fuel rather than 
discourage the unstable growth of new forms of credit, consequently leading to 
the Great Crash in 1929. In that period, through various marketing schemes and 
new financial instruments financial firms extended the use of finance by 
including a growing amount of people on the stock market. Moreover, contrary 
to conventional wisdom, the New Deal
35
 response to the depression did not 
                                                                                                                   
of distinctive national development trajectories. Geoffrey Ingham, Concepts of money, 
Edward Elgar Publishing, 2005; Giovanni Arrighi and Beverly J. Silver, Chaos and 
Governance in the Modern World System, Minneapolis, MN, University of Minnesota 
Press, 1999. 
32  Rob Aitken, Performing Capital: Toward a Cultural Economy of Popular and Global 
Finance, Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2007. 
33  Martijn Konings, The Development of American Finance, New York, Cambridge 
University Press, 2011. 
34  Rik W. Hafer, The Federal Reserve System: An Encyclopedia, Westport, Connecticut, 
Greenwood Press, 2005. 
35  The reforms of the New Deal were a contradictory process, while posing restrictions on 
capital mobility it further integrated American population into the financial system. The 
restriction of liquidity creation with the Glass-Steagall act should not be taken as 
representative of policies in this period. Rob Aitken, Performing Capital: Toward a 
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restrain but promote the integration of the American middle and working 
classes into the financial system.
36
 Following Konings:  
 
“In an important sense, private credit in America was the functional equivalent of public 
programs in Europe. After WWII, the American working classes would become ever 
more fully integrated into the financial system, as lenders and savers but also as borrowers 
and consumers.”
37
 
 
The post-war era later witnessed remarkable innovations in speculative 
practices related to the demand for credit generated by the Fordist consumption. 
As a fact, by the late 1950s, American commercial banks introduced - through 
the development of negotiable certificates of deposit - new forms of 
securitization, further enhancing their capacity to create liquidity. This suggests 
that IPE’s concept of “embedded liberalism” offers little conceptual grasp on 
the analysis of financial change in the post-war era.
38
 Indeed, even when, during 
the 1960s, the Federal Reserve sought to regulate these innovations, American 
commercial banks turned to the foreign Eurodollar markets,
39
 beginning to 
apply the new financial techniques in this offshore space, setting the backdrop 
for further international financial developments. The inflationary consequences 
of banks’ operations in the Eurodollar market set the context in which the shift 
to monetarism and neoliberalism is reinterpreted. Whereas IPE interprets the 
political turn to neoliberalism as a series of policies through which the 
American state actions pursued the interest of international finance, it was 
                                                                                                                   
Cultural Economy of Popular and Global Finance, Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 
2009. 
36  This was visible in U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission’s will to further banks 
securitisation. Conceptualising state agency as opposed to a “unitary vision of the state” 
lead us to conceptualise this process as a contradictory one. Jack Copley. “Financial 
Deregulation and the Role of Statecraft: Lessons from Britain’s 1971 Competition and 
Credit Control Measures”, New Political Economy, vol. 22, no. 6 2017, pp. 692-708. As a 
fact the Glass-Steagall act regulatory constraints meant that disintermediation posed 
important challenges to investment banks. However, these constraints were circumvented 
by commercial banks’ agency in the 1950s with the development of the certificate of 
deposits. 
37  Martijn Konings, “European Finance in the American Mirror: Financial Change and 
the Reconfiguration of Competitiveness,” Contemporary Politics, vol. 14, no. 3, 
2008, pp. 253-275. 
38  Hannes Lacher, “The Politics of the Market: Re-Reading Karl Polanyi”, Global Society, 
vol. 13, no. 3, 1999, pp. 313-326.  
39  Dollars that because of the dollar overhang were now owned by foreign investments, 
primarily in the market of London. More specifically, Eurodollars are U.S. dollar 
denominated deposits held at banks outside of the United States. See Stefano Battilossi, 
“International Banking and the American Challenge in Historical Perspective”, in Stefano 
Battilossi and Youssef Cassis, European Banks and the American Challenge: Competition 
and Cooperation in International Banking under Bretton Woods, Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 2002, p. 19. 
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rather the implementation of regulations to limit speculative finance which 
prompted innovation on the fronts of financial securitisation and the creation of 
liquidity.
40
 Drawing on Konings’ account,41 the state unwittingly triggered 
further financial innovation
42
 through the high-interest rates established during 
the Volcker Shock in 1979.
43
 Even though the monetarist doctrine was 
implementing high-interest rates in order to contain money creation, financial 
credit began to expand again at a faster rate following the shock. Initially 
Volcker's high-interest rate triggered immediate and drastic drops in investment 
into the manufacturing economy, yet Federal Reserve regulations did not stop 
financial innovation in the banking sector. Quite contrarily, banks were able to 
create further credit, leading total American debt in 1984 to be twice as high as 
in 1977. By redirecting inflation from market price to financial assets, the 
FED’s shock dissipated U.S. state’s worries over the dramatic consequence of 
inflation, whilst simultaneously spurring financial innovation. Thus, the turn to 
neoliberalism did not subject public purpose and power to the external 
discipline of disembedded global markets, rather its consequences (the 
redirection of inflation from prices to assets) were considered congenial to the 
objectives of both U.S. state and financial capital. This resulted in the 
development of a new paradigm of policies – “neoliberal governance”- based on 
the management of speculation and financial practices.
44
 This brief historical 
section has introduced our conceptualisation of the process of the globalisation 
of finance. Indeed, the story of financial globalisation often focuses too much 
on the demise of the institutions of Bretton Woods as a moment in which the 
forces of financial globalisation are fully liberated and unleashed. However, the 
growth of financial practices globally cannot be studied as the natural 
consequence of the demise of a monetary system's institutional framework, in 
that financial globalisation involves multiple and linked processes of 
innovation, growing market complexity and the penetration of financial 
                                               
40  Leo Panitch and Martijn Konings, “Myths of Neoliberal Deregulation”, New Left Review, 
2009. 
41  Martijn Konings, The Development of American Finance, New York, Cambridge 
University Press, 2011. 
42  The liberalization of the securities industry and the creation of a market for corporate 
control further multiplied the products and services that banks could offer. Lena Rethel 
and Timothy J. Sinclair, The Problem with Banks, London, Zed Books, 2012; Allen 
Kaufman and Ernest J. Englander, “Kohlberg Kravis Roberts & Co. and the restructuring 
of American capitalism”, Business History Review, vol. 67, no. 1, 1993, pp. 52-97. 
43  Giovanni Arrighi, The Long Twentieth Century : Money  Power  and the Origins of Our 
Times, London, Verso, 1994. 
44  The period following the monetarist shock saw the rise of a new regime of governance -
Neoliberalism- based on a new degree of congruence between the regulatory aims of the 
American state and financial interests. In Konings’ words this “set the basis for a market-
oriented modality of regulation” Konings, “European Finance in the American Mirror: 
Financial Change and the Reconfiguration of Competitiveness”, 2008, p. 260. 
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relations into diverse social spheres. This section has highlighted how modern 
financial practices - i.e. securitisation – had their roots in the American context 
and how this has important consequences for how we study the process of 
financialisation. In order to conceptualise the growth of modern financial 
practices outside the American context, the next section will analyse their 
spread to the British context.  
 
 
Financialisation in the United Kingdom 
 
A reflection of this sort means that the U.K. financial system will perhaps 
not best be understood as an equal constituent in the category of the Anglo-
American model. To do this, this section will reconsider the internationalisation 
of securitisation practices by looking at the Big Bang. The Big Bang of 1986 
marks, conventionally, the beginning of a series of deregulations which are said 
to have stimulated the development of global finance in the U.K. While the 
Institutionalist literature argues that the state played an active role in 
constructing the reforms, it remains unclear the state’s direct interest in 
pursuing financial market liberalisation. Yet, British state interests were a 
crucial part of what is otherwise generalised as part of neoliberal deregulatory 
policies. Indeed, the liberalization of the City of London’s market was 
motivated more by state authorities’ concern with the management of sovereign 
debt than with liberalising markets. As Sahil Dutta (2018) demonstrates, 
whereas the Fed’s regulations in the 1960s led American banks to go abroad 
and apply their new financial techniques in Euromarkets,
4546
 this did not mean 
that U.S. intermediaries could easily find new markets as easily as they wished 
or assumed. At that time, debt management was a significant concern for 
Britain’s monetary authorities because of the Bank of England’s indebtedness 
related to the two world wars and the Keynesian period that followed. 
Previously to the Big Bang, The London Stock Exchange was the principal loci 
where the state secured credit provision. However, in the 1970s, policymakers 
showed dissatisfaction with the inefficiency of the small and lightly-capitalised 
                                               
45  Richard Roberts, “The London Financial Services Cluster since the 1970s: Expansion, 
Development and Internationalization”, Paris Congress, Paris School of Economics, 
2008, pp. 10-11. 
46  London’s insertion into international networks was equally important as an incentive for 
American banks to set up branches in the U.K. during the 1960s, when they followed 
American corporations. “International Banking and the American Challenge in Historical 
Perspective. European Banks and the American Challenge: Competition and Cooperation 
in International Banking under Bretton Woods”, 2002; Eric Helleiner, States and the 
Reemergence of Global Finance – From Bretton Woods to the 1990s., Ithaca, NY, Cornell 
University Press, 1994. 
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firms to underwrite the state’s debt issues. This, in turn, led the Bank of 
England to actively absorb its own issues, creating excessive liquidity in the 
financial system. This had the unintended consequence of resulting in a conflict 
between the aim of monetary policies – which was at the time concerned about 
restricting credit creation- and the actual practices of debt management – which, 
on the other hand, did the opposite. Significantly, by changing the rules on 
membership and trading in the London Stock Exchange, the Big Bang worked 
to greatly expand the size and liquidity of the market for British sovereign debt. 
By opening membership up, it brought highly-capitalised, international 
financial houses to the Exchange: 
 
“At a time when the national debt, which had long been a permanent part of British 
capitalism, was growing and inflation and unemployment was still high, this was a crucial 
change. It gave the state greater capacity to raise finance more easily and, in doing so, 
allowed it to pursue monetary policy in a way that was impossible before. By deepening 
the market for government debt securities, the Bank no longer had to intervene directly in 
the gilt market.”47 
 
Whilst on a more systemic level the Big Bang represents the first step 
towards the generalisation of U.S. financial practices internationally
48
 - as 
reflected in the use of dollar securities in the UK market -it is misleading to 
assume that the agency of the British state in this process can be interpreted as 
merely passive. By recasting the Big Bang in terms of the management of 
sovereign debt, the work of Sahil Dutta offers a way to bring the state’s interest 
into the centre of the financialisation account, in that the long-term impact of 
Big Bang reforms was to expand the capacity of the British state to manage its 
debt. In other words, the adoption of U.S. financial practices revealed to be 
beneficial to the British state’s capacity to increase its financial liquidity in an 
unprecedented manner.  
To sum up, the section has attempted to show how the complex and 
intertwined history of finance can hardly be understood through the lens of 
states vs markets. By limiting the investigation of states’ activity to an inquiry 
of its regulatory apparatus, scholars end up neglecting the way in which 
financialisation practices are profoundly shaped by state interests and actions 
and, as a corollary, of how socially constructed finance is. The history presented 
                                               
47  Sahil Jai Dutta, “Sovereign debt management and the globalization of finance: Recasting 
the City of London’s ‘Big Bang’”, Competition & Change, vol. 22, no. 1, 2018, pp. 3-22. 
48  This not only meant that British banks and brokers could now fully participate in the 
financial networks built around the Eurodollar markets, but also opened the doors to the 
fuller infiltration of Britain’s domestic financial system by American banks. Philip Augar, 
The death of gentlemanly capitalism: the controversial bestseller on the City’s big sell-
out, London, Penguin Books, 2001. Indeed, this process consolidated the role of the dollar 
worldwide, with securitisation being an advantage for US banks, feeding US speculative 
markets.  
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problematises institutionalist PE assumptions in three aspects. Firstly, and of 
main importance for this article, it counters those approaches which deny the 
contribution that state governance can give to financial speculation. This brief 
review has emphasized how, counterintuitively, it was the very adoption of 
regulations to limit concentration and speculation which would prompt 
innovations on the fronts of financial securitisation and the creation of liquidity. 
Secondly, by emphasising how Neoliberalism – in both cases - builds a novel 
form of governance based on the management of financial markets, this review 
questions the idea that public purpose and interest is necessarily subjected to the 
external discipline of disembedded global markets. The third point emphasizes 
that in key respects the development of financial practices in the Anglo-
American core rests on a formalised set of institutions, rather than what is 
usually assumed. The leverage that financial institutions built by involving an 
ever-growing population in financial markets was possible solely thanks to the 
popularisation of high finance to a larger part of society, in which the reforms of 
New deal, and the action of the Federal Reserve and the Bank of England 
played a crucial role. 
 
 
Towards the Study of Financial Globalisation: an Agency-
Centred Approach 
 
In recent years, scholars of Political Economy literature, encouraged by 
the subprime crisis and its differential impact throughout the globe, have begun 
to map how financialisation affects societies and areas outside the U.S. and the 
U.K.
49
 However, the evidence that the previous section has brought by showing 
how American and British finance are very politicised, calls for a substantive 
recalibration of IPE understanding of the process of financialisation. Indeed, 
this literature has entrained a specific understanding of financial practices which 
are thought of as endowed of a proper autonomous logic which flattens 
institutional diversity worldwide. This literature has used a specific 
methodology in the analysis of financialisation in the international context. 
Scholars tend to analyse financial globalisation in terms of a convergence-
divergence process towards the practices present in the Anglo-Saxon model, 
considered the most advanced form of capitalism. Whilst the use of speculative 
                                               
49  Ewald Engelen and Martijn Konings, “Financial Capitalism Resurgent: Comparative 
Institutionalism and the Challenges of Financialization”, in Glenn Morgan, John L. 
Campbell, Colin Crouch, Ove Kaj Pedersen, and Richard Whitley (eds.), The Oxford 
Handbook of Comparative Institutional Analysis, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2010, 
pp. 601-624; Mareike Beck and Julian Germann, “Managerial Power in the German 
Model: The Case of Bertelsmann and the Antecedents of Neoliberalism”, Globalizations, 
vol.13, no.3, 2018, pp. 1–14.  
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practices is seen as the natural tendency within liberal frames of governance, 
the previous section has intended to show how, instead financialisation is a 
social construction, with its roots in the American context. The consolidation of 
American finance required a vast set of institutional features in which the 
actions and interests of the state played a crucial role. This directly speaks to the 
inadequacy of conceptualising financial globalisation by studying the degree of 
liberalization of a country and in terms of a contamination from the Anglo-
Saxon core. In other words, mapping this process internationally in terms of 
state vs markets has reduced the highly variable ways in which people outside 
the Anglo-American heartland experience financialised practices through 
modalities that are institutionally and discursively diverse. Whilst the story of 
financial globalisation often focuses too much on the demise of the institutions 
of Bretton Woods in the unleashing of the forces of financial globalisation, this 
article has proposed an agency-centred approach which thinks financial 
practices as strictly related to their contingent and peculiar context. 
Financialisation in international contexts cannot be conceptualised as simply 
reflecting a degree of subordination to Anglo-American finance and its crisis-
prone practices, and neither according to its ‘market’ orientation. I argue that 
understanding financialisation as a historical process means coupling the 
theorisation of the latter with an appreciation of how agential power is essential 
in promoting social change. This means reconsidering power from the 
perspective of agents to appreciate how our social reality does not entail an 
agent-structure dichotomy, but an interaction between agents which is 
intermediated by incessantly renegotiated institutions and discourses.
50
 More 
specifically, IPE and CPE both rely on a structuralist conception of 
financialisation which adopts the concept of pressure as inherent to the power 
that finance exerts on societies. However, from a methodological standpoint, 
this article argues that this conception does not allow for a dynamic 
understanding of historical change. To address the issue of financialisation the 
article puts forward the idea that what is usually assumed to be a monolithic 
pressure, should be reinterpreted into the more flexible definition of imperative. 
These imperatives are methodologically important as they allow to cast a 
spotlight on the social opportunities and problems created by agents for other 
social agents. Whilst methods which function on the notion of limit 
contextualises social change in a non-specific, a-historical fashion, the notion of 
imperative gives us a blank canvas which forces us to focus on history rather 
than a static model to understand social struggles and capitalistic development. 
This is valuable as it recognises how social constraints develop in a more 
dynamic way than structural methodologies can account for, without 
                                               
50  The terms “institution” and “discourse” are used together to denote the intertwined 
material and ideal nature of human practices. 
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downplaying the influence that these social agents have on a wider process of 
social change.
51
 In this historically sensitive scenario, financialisation – far from 
being a reified system – finally appears as a continuously differentiated 
ensemble of institutional and discursive architectures in the making.
52
 This way 
of framing financialisation has deep implications for how to think the 
relationship between states and markets and the process of financialisation. In 
this context, markets are analysed not as a disembedding logic over society, 
rather the organisation and institutionalisation of market activity are thought of 
as a social construction that can provide a key infrastructure for state 
intervention. This essentially means debunking the IPE/CPE conception of state 
agency, which should not be analysed through a predefined set of actions -i.e. 
regulatory actions- but through a historically minded method.
53
 This means 
studying states and markets each time in specific terms, looking at the dynamics 
generated by agents when they manipulate these living institutions and 
discourses in search for a leverage to exert power over others. As this thesis 
claims, the agency-centred approach provides the historically sensitive scenario 
through which to appreciate how and why state’s agents worldwide – through 
their conflicts as well as their institutional and discursive manipulation – 
produce different traits of financialisation across social spaces.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
This paper has offered a brief apercu for the study of financialisation in 
the Anglo-Saxon and international contexts. The article has argued that that the 
association of liberal forms of governance to speculation has formed an a-social 
framework for studying speculation practices within financialisation. Short of a 
proper conception of the social fundamentals of such practices, the process of 
                                               
51  Martijn Konings, “Political institutions and economic imperatives: bringing agency back 
in”, Research in Political Economy, vol. 22, 2005, pp. 85-130. 
52  These institutions and discourses reflect the agential power of certain social forces who 
advance them to make sense of the surrounding reality and to leverage their own position 
vis-`a-vis other forces. It is important to note that the agential process of constructing 
institutional and discursive structures does not lead to the consolidation of an objectified 
reality. On the contrary, it allows people to use those structures for their own strategic 
purposes. In other words, whilst neoliberal reformists in Anglo-Saxon countries surely 
exerted power by building market-oriented institutions and discourses, other agents lived 
such constraints in their own terms – eventually transforming the very same restrictive 
rules they were initially subjected to. Samuel Knafo, “Critical Approaches and the Legacy 
of the Agent/Structure Debate in International Relations,” Cambridge Review of 
International Affairs, vol. 23, no. 3, 2010, pp. 493-516.  
53  Quentin Skinner,  isions of Politics.  olume 1 … cit.; George C. Comninel, “Critical 
Thinking and Class Analysis: Historical Materialism and Social Theory”, Socialism and 
Democracy, vol. 27, no. 1, March 2013, pp. 19–56. 
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financial change too often appears as the natural tendency of capitalism when 
left outside state supervision. The central claim of this paper - i.e. to take 
seriously the argument that financialization should be treated a social-historical 
category - reminds us that from a methodological standpoint, we should be 
careful to depict the process of financialisation as implying a dismissal of 
states’ interests in place of markets’ one. By drawing on recent literature, this 
paper has argued that the development of financialisation requires the 
formalisation of an institutional setup in order to be viable. More specifically, in 
the construction of the practices of financialisation, the actions and interests of 
the respective states have played a crucial role. The example of the American 
and the British instauration of financialisation show how global financial 
markets also present opportunities for states to shape and improve the terms by 
which states obtain finance. From these evidences, this paper puts forth an 
approach for the study of financialisation in diverse contexts based on the 
methodological use of historical research. The institutional Political economy 
debate falls short of capturing historically the political meanings of the process 
of financialisation. This agency-centred perspective serves to renew current 
debates which may benefit from a focus on the innovative ways in which states 
react to the challenges of financialisation. The broader argument and evidence 
presented in this article has put forward a methodological tool through which 
PE scholars may examine how state agencies shape financial markets, and that 
what may appear as financial liberalisation, can also shape and enhance the state 
capacities to act in financial markets and govern the economy more broadly. 
More specifically, the historical evidence brought by these accounts advocates 
scholars to analyse the financialisation process by analysing the mechanism of 
raising and managing budget policies and sovereign debt. Aside from offering a 
different perspective on financial globalisation this contribution also speaks to 
the growing interest in financial statecraft and the impact of sovereign debt in 
the contemporary global political economy.  
 
 
